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A PROACTIVE SOLUTION To THE INHERENT DANGERS OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY: USING THE INVENTION SECRECY ACT To
RESTRICT DISCLOSURE OF THREATENING BIOTECHNOLOGY
PATENTS
JAMES W. PARRETT, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Biotechnology is a rapidly expanding field that the United States
should address seriously. This technology, while offering many beneficial
advances, also presents a strong threat to national security. Good
examples of this threat include genetically engineered crops that compete
and can destroy local biodiversity, increased bacterial resistance through
overuse of conventional antibiotics, and the overwhelming threat of
biological warfare through genetically created and enhanced diseases.'
One potential way to address this threat without stifling the
advancement of biotechnology is through the United States patent system.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office encourages innovation of
* Mr. Parrett received his B.S. from James Madison University in 1997, majoring in
Chemistry and Biology, and expects to receive his J.D. from William and Mary School of
Law in May 2002. The author wishes to thank Erin O'Callaghan for her help in editing
this Note, and his fiancee Carrie Veronica Smith for her inexhaustible patience,
inspiration, and support, without which the writing of this Note would have been
impossible.
I See Bioterrorism: Our Frontline Response, Evaluating US. Public Health and Medical
Readiness: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Health of the S. Comm. on Health,
Educ., Labor and Pensions, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Stephanie B.C. Bailey,
M.D., Director, Metropolitan Health Department, Nashville and Davidson County,
Tennessee) [hereinafter Bioterrorism].
The potential public threats we all face are growing in number,
complexity and severity. Rapid air travel means grave infectious
diseases can be spread from one country to another simply when an
infected person takes a plane flight. Our food supply has become
globalized, and we are more vulnerable to food-borne diseases from
imported food than ever before. Insidious bacteria that have mutated so
that they are no longer easily treatable with existing antibiotics are
multiplying in number. Virulent new viruses, such as hantavirus and
Ebola, have emerged. And reports of instances where persons have
access to biological weapons are increasing.
Id.
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new technologies by granting limited monopolies to the inventors to
exclude others from using those technologies for a time.2 In exchange, the
inventors must disclose their new inventions to the public, adding to the
field of common knowledge. 3  The Invention Secrecy Act of 19514
("ISA") was enacted to control the disclosure of scientific inventions in
which the United States may have a property interest based on the
concerns of national security. The ISA allows the Commissioner of the
Patent and Trademark Office to keep an invention secret through a
government mandated secrecy order while the invention's potential threat
is evaluated by the appropriate administrative agency. 5  Originally,
concerns for these secrecy orders were for inventions such as those
involving rocketry and atomic weapons. While containing broad language
that might apply to any type of invention, the ISA did not contemplate the
development of biotechnology. The biotechnology industry at the time
was at best in its infancy, and patents for living organisms were excluded.6
As biotechnology grows in national prominence, however, a careful
review of its potential effects is warranted. The ISA gives an opportunity
to review biotechnology patents and their potential impacts on national
security.
Secrecy orders issued under the ISA provide several advantages
for the control of potentially harmful technologies, without stifling the
incentives for research. While a secrecy order is an obvious prior restraint
on the dissemination of information, this restraint allows for an effective
evaluation of the invention before it becomes general knowledge. When
threats are discovered, a short delay before issuance of the patent would
give the United States a head start in preventing future disaster, such as
starting work on vaccines to potentially threatening viruses. The secrecy
order is also evaluated by the agency best suited to understand the new
invention, so that an accurate assessment of the impact of the new
technology is made.
This Note argues that, through the use of secrecy orders,
biotechnology patents that could potentially affect national security can be
evaluated properly by an appropriate technical agency, allowing for
control of the technology before it becomes a problem that cannot be
2 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
3 Id. § 112.
4Id. §§ 181-88.
5Id. § 181.
6 See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948). See also
infra notes 101-114 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standards for
patentable subject matter.
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contained. Section II of this Note discusses what biotechnology is and
how it can present a threat to public health and safety. Section III
discusses the current regulation of biotechnology and the statutory
controls on dissemination of information. Section IV discusses the United
States Patent System and how secrecy orders from the ISA can be used to
curtail the public disclosure of inventions that are dangerous to the
national security. Section V discusses the constitutional implications of
the ISA and other potential problems associated with using the Act. This
Note then concludes that use of the ISA allows for a careful review of
biotechnology before any information is widely disseminated. This
review will allow the government to restrict the disclosure of threatening
technologies before they are given a chance to develop into more serious
problems.
II. THE NATURE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
A. Biotechnology in General
Biotechnology is a broad term encompassing a variety of different
ideas. Biotechnology, however, is normally associated with recombinant
DNA technology. Using this technique, genetic material can be inserted
into the target's genome from another source to create a modified
organism. This technology was largely developed in the 1970s and was
facilitated by the discovery of specific enzymes, which allowed for the
development of rapid DNA sequencing so that large sections of DNA
could be isolated and mapped. In addition, this technology allowed for
the creation of cloned cells that are exactly the same as, and carry the
identical DNA of, the parent cells.8 Over time, scientists have adapted
7See generally HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 221-61 (3d ed.,
1995) (providing an overview of the techniques and terms of recombinant DNA
technology).
The discovery of two types of enzymes provided the impetus for these
recent developments and permit DNA cloning. One type, called
restriction enzymes, cut the DNA from any organism at specific
sequences of a few nucleotides, generating a reproducible set of
fragments. The other type, called DNA ligases, can insert DNA
restriction fragments into replicating DNA molecules producing
recombinant DNA.
Id. at 221.8 1d.
2001]
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biotechnology to a variety of uses in many different environments. 9 The
natural result of this is that biotechnology is a significant advancement
that has the potential to affect everyone across the globe. Given this broad
reach, a careful analysis of the benefits and risks associated with
biotechnology is warranted.
B. Genetically Engineered Microorganisms
One common line of research in the biotechnology field is the
creation of new microorganisms. Genetically engineered microorganisms
are bacteria that have been artificially manipulated through recombinant
DNA technology for some specific purpose. For example, one potential
application is to add gene coding for biological pesticides to other
organisms to make those organisms resistant to other pests.'0 A different
application is to use biological microorganisms to reduce the
concentration of toxic chemicals through bioremediation.II These
organisms could also be modified to remove their plasmid transfer
functions in an effort to prevent the strains of that microorganism that are
used for pest control from transferring their modified genes to virulent
strains of the same bacteria.12
There are a variety of concerns about the potential environmental
effects of genetically modified organisms. For example:
A major concern was that organisms would be created with
novel genotypes that would have unpredictable or harmful
properties that could threaten human health or the
environment. Such novel agents, for example, might result
in new pathways for the spread of disease or might produce
9 For a chronological overview of the development of biotechnology, see LISA YOUNT,
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GENETIC ENGINEERING 93-106 (2000).
10 See Raymond A. Zilinskas, Analysis of the Ecological Risks Associated with
Genetically Engineered Marine Organisms, in GENETICALLY ENGINEERED MARINE
ORGANISMS: ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC RISKS AND BENEFITS 110 (Raymond A.
Zilinkas & Peter J. Balint eds., 1998).
1d. at 111.
12 See Maarten H. Ryder & Raymond L. Correll, Assessing the Potential Benefits and
Risks of Introducing Natural and Genetically Manipulated Bacteria for the Control of
Soil-Borne Root Diseases, in BIOLOGICAL CONTROL: BENEFITS AND RISKS 211 (Heikki
M.T. Hokkanen & James M. Lynch eds., 1995).
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animal tumor viruses that might be introduced into the
human intestinal tract, with uncertain results.13
In essence, there is a great deal of uncertainty as to what will happen when
a new species is introduced into a non-native environment. 14 However,
"[t]here are many examples of such damage occurring from the transfer of
species to foreign environments. The clogging of African waterways with
the South American water hyacinth and the erosion in Australia caused by
the introduction of rabbits are two examples.' 15 It is also difficult to
predict what effect these organisms will have on the other species in the
environment into which they are introduced. 16  Of course, a counter
argument can be posed that bacteria are constantly exposed to new DNA
naturally present within the environment, so genetic manipulation by man
is no different than what is taking place in nature. It is worth noting,
however, that what mankind does is far more potent than simply speeding
up the evolutionary process through direct manipulation. 17 Thus, it would
13 David Ozonoff, Just When You Thought It Was Safe: An Update on the Risks of
Recombinant DNA Technology, in GENETICS AND THE LAW III 467, 469 (Aubrey
Milunsky & George J. Annas eds., 1985).
14 See L.E. Ehler, Planned Introductions in Biological Control, in ASSESSING
ECOLOGICAL RISKS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 27-28 (Lev R. Ginzburg ed., 1991) (claiming
that "every introduction of an exotic species can be expected to have an environmental
impact of one sort or another. These impacts may or may not be predictable, and their
effects can vary according to a number of factors.. ").
15 Klaus Bosselmann, Plants and Politics: The International Legal Regime Concerning
Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 111, 119 (1996).1 6 See id.; see also Ehler, supra note 14, at 35.
17 See M.J. Day & J.C. Fry, Microbial Ecology, Genetics, and Risk Assessment, in
RELEASE OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED AND OTHER MICRO-ORGANISMS 160 (J.C. Fry &
M.J. Day eds., 1992).
Vast numbers of plants, animals, and microbes die daily and, during
their decay, present DNA directly to bacteria capable of taking it up.
Thus, it is conceivable that DNA exchange occurs routinely in nature.
There is a difference, however, between this natural presentation of
non-specific DNA and DNA entering the environment within GEMS
["genetically modified organisms"]. DNA derived from GEMs has not
been subjected to natural selection for its amplification. At no time
during its synthesis did it compete with natural organisms or have
natural selective pressures imposed upon it. The GEM DNA, in stable
recombinant organisms, will be released into the environment in
relatively large amounts. Thus, the evolution of GEMs, which are
constructed in the laboratory, does not rely on chance, their fitness or
on natural selection.
2001]
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be incorrect to argue that this genetic enhancement by scientists is the
equivalent of the natural selection process.
An additional concern with genetically engineered organisms is
that it may prove difficult to control modified organisms once they are
released into the environment, despite any pre-release safeguards placed
on them.' 8 The inherent uncertainty of what environmental impact the
release of genetically engineered organisms will have gives an excellent
reason to examine them closely when they are being developed. Initial
review of the impact of these organisms while an applicant files for a
patent on those organisms would allow their risks to be safely assessed
before they are blindly released into the environment to cause unforeseen
results.
C. Biotechnology and Agriculture
In the late eighteenth century, economist Thomas Malthus
predicted that the world's population would reach unsustainable levels as
only so much food could be grown.' 9 What Malthus could not account for
was the fact that technology could create higher yields of food, allowing
the population to expand even further.20 Agriculture is one of the fields
that has most benefited from the development of biotechnology. 21 Of
course, agricultural biotechnology is nothing new. Scientists have known
that they could select the traits they want expressed in plants from as early
18 See Francis E. Sharples, Genetic Engineering Raises Environmental Concerns, in
GENETIC ENGINEERING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 40-42 (William Dudley ed., 1990).
[T]he degree of control afforded by experiments conducted in
containment differs from that involved in releases in the field. Once
released, modified organisms that find suitable habitats may not only
reproduce and spread, but can be expected to evolve in ways that are
beneficial to their own survival. The evolution process can allow
modified organisms to escape constraints imposed by debilitating them
before their release, so that both physical and biological containment
may be nullified outside the laboratory.
Id. at 40.
19 See THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (Philip
Appleman ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1976) (1798).
20 /d. at xvi.
21 See A. Shinmyo et al., Gene Regulation in Plant Cells, in ADVANCES IN PLANT
BIOTECHNOLOGY 12 (D.D.Y. Ryu & S. Furusaki eds., 1994).
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as the work of Gregor Mendel. With the advent of recombinant DNA
technology, however, the ability to alter agriculture is greatly enhanced.
There are many potentially useful agricultural products being
developed with biotechnology. Examples include higher yielding crops,
herbicide resistant crops, and crops that are engineered to be naturally pest
resistant.23 Applying biotechnology to agriculture can also result in large
economic savings, as pesticides may no longer be needed.24 Proponents of
biotechnology claim that with more productive and efficient food sources,
we will be able to preserve the Earth's biodiversity. 25 Others counter by
claiming that even with advances in agricultural science biodiversity has
been historically lost.26 .
Modified agricultural products can also be used to address some of
the world's nutritional problems. For example, about 100 million children
suffer from Vitamin A deficiency, which can lead to blindness and a
decreased immune system.27 Up to 3.7 billion people, particularly women,
suffer from iron deficiency, which can cause anemia and result in children
who are stillborn or underweight and who are likely to die shortly after
childbirth.28 Fortunately, scientists have developed a new grain of rice
infused with the Vitamin A precursor beta-carotene and iron, which could
solve these problems.
29
22 Gregor Mendel is credited with discovering the rules of inheritance in genetics. In the
mid-nineteenth century, Mendel conducted experiments on garden pea plants. Through
cross-pollination of the plants, he was able to select which traits were expressed in future
plant generations, including whether the peas were wrinkled, the height of the plants, and
the color of the peas. See ROBERT H. TAMARIN, PRINCIPLES OF GENETICS 3-39 (2d ed.
1986).
23 See Henrique Freire de Oliveira Souza, Genetically Modified Plants:, A Need for
International Regulation, 6 ANN. SuRV. INT'L & COMP. L. 129, 138 (2000).
24 See Industrial Biotechnology Ass'n, Genetic Engineering Benefits Agriculture, in
GENETIC ENGINEERING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, supra note 18, at 119 (stating that
"[g]enetically engineered tomato and tobacco plants have been made resistant to a viral
disease that costs farmers as much as $200 million ever year").
25 See Robert B. Horsch & Robert T. Fraley, Biotechnology Can Help Reduce the Loss of
Biodiversity, in PROTECTION OF GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY 50 (Lakshman D. Grurswamy &
Jeffrey A. McNeely eds., 1998).
26 See Bosselmann, supra note 15, at Ill (explaining that "[t]he rise of biotechnology,
especially in the areas of agriculture and pharmaceuticals, has paralleled the loss of
biodiversity").
27 Gordon Conway, Foodfor All in the 21st Century, ENVIRONMENT, Jan. 1, 2000, at 9.
28 Id.
29 Id.; see Trisha Gura, New Genes Boost Rice Nutrients, SCIENCE, Aug. 13, 1999, at 994.
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The advantages of applying biotechnology to agriculture are not
without associated risks. One concern is whether genetically modified
food itself is safe to eat.30 Another concern is that insect resistant crops
may become useless if the insects develop a resistance to the toxins used
to repel them.3 1 It may be possible that through careful planning and
regulation of this use of genetically modified agriculture, this risk can be
prevented. Given, however, that mutation can arise either spontaneously
or in response to some physical or chemical agent, 32 and that insects
generally have a short lifespan,33 the ability for the insects to adapt to the
resistant crops is simply a matter of time.
A different, yet equally significant concern with engineered plants
is that the plants themselves may become pests within the ecosystem.
34
Modified organisms could compete so successfully within their ecosystem
so as to disturb natural balances and dominate their environment. 35 While
this may seem like science fiction,36 a real world example is seen in
kudzu. Originally transferred to the United States as an ornamental plant,
kudzu is now an agricultural pest in the Southwestern United States.37 A
30 See MARTIN TEITEL & KIMBERLY A. WILSON, GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOOD:
CHANGING THE NATURE OF NATURE (1999) (discussing how genetically engineered food
products are created and whether they are safe). See also Dan L. Burk, The Milk Free
Zone: Federal and Local Interests in Regulating Recombinant BST, 22 COLUM J. ENVTL.
L. 227 (1997) (discussing the safety and regulation of genetically modified milk).
31 Michael A. Whittaker, Reevaluating the Food and Drug Administration's Stand on
Labeling Genetically Engineered Foods, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1215, 1220-21 (1998).
32 See generally, LANSING M. PRESCOTr, MICROBIOLOGY 244-50 (2d ed. 1993)
discussing the biochemical origination of mutations).
3 As an example, the common fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster, which has historically
been used by biology students to study the expression of genetic phenotypes, has a short
feneration time of twelve to fourteen days. TAMARIN, supra note 22, at 59.
4 See David J. Earp, Comment, The Regulation of Genetically Engineered Plants.: Is
Peter Rabbit Safe in Mr. McGregor's Transgenic Vegetable Patch?, 24 ENVTL. L. 1633,
1653-54 (1994).
35 Bosselmann, supra note 15, at 119 (stating that "[e]ven with less-robust species, such
as wheat, which are extremely unlikely to escape into the wild, their introduction can
change populations of microorganims in the soil and the number and types of insects,
birds, and herbivores in the surrounding area").
36 For an example of this very issue in literature, see ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, STARSHIP
TROOPERS 123-24 (Ace Books 1987) (1959).
37 See generally JANET LEMBKE, DESPICABLE SPECIES: ON COWBIRDS, KUDZU,
HoRNwoRMS, AND OTHER SCOURGES 129-54 (1999) (describing the dominance of the
invasive plant kudzu within the Southern United States ecosystem).
Throughout the South, kudzu creeps with stealthy swiftness over
brushpiles and fences. It climbs trees and telephone poles and casts its
[Vol. 26:145
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related consideration is that these modified plants would hybridize with
native plant species, potentially making these wild plants more resilient
and capable of spreading in their environment much like weeds
themselves.38 Were scientists to introduce a plant species that dominated
its ecosystem, or a species that destroyed essential crops like grains, the
United States would then be in grave danger. These concerns are
significant enough to be relevant to the nation's future. Therefore, a
careful review of new agricultural biotechnology patents is warranted due
to their potentially serious environmental impacts.
D. Bioterrorism
Perhaps the worst danger posed by biotechnology is the use of
man-made or modified microbes as agents of terror or warfare. While
biological warfare has been used throughout most of recorded history,
39
the ability to modify and enhance naturally occurring diseases to make
even more resilient diseases poses a grave danger to society. 40 Diseases
soft but heavy net over thickets and hedgerows. It enshrouds
abandoned houses, tumbledown tobacco barns, rusted appliances, and
junked cars. It sneaks into gardens and plowed fields. Displacing
innocent native vegetation, it twines, curls, shoots upward and outward
with relentless green insistence. In its wake, power outages occur, and
trains have been derailed. By the mid-1990s, kudzu had laid claim to
more than 7,000,000 acres-almost 11,000 square miles-of the South.
Monstrous roots thrust deep into the earth of at least sixteen states,
ropey vines embrace the landscape, and leaves smother it in a big, soft,
fuzzy, unbreakable hug. Once the vine invades any location, getting rid
of it is well nigh impossible. And it seizes another 120,000 acres every
year, a rate that can only increase with the increase in the plant's
domain.
Id.
38 See Earp, supra note 34, at 1654. A related concern is that these transgenic plants
could transfer their enhanced genes to native weeds, in effect creating even tougher
weeds. Id.
39 See Ronald M. Atlas, Combating the Threat of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism, 49
BIOSCIENCE 465 (1999) (describing the historical use of biological agents in warfare).
40 See Harlee Strauss & Jonathan King, The Fallacy of Defensive Biological Weapons
Programmes, in BIOLOGICAL AND ToxIN WEAPONS TODAY 66 (Erhard Geissler ed.,
1986).
Organisms dangerous to human health and welfare, such as influenza
virus, dengue virus, Bacillus anthracis and the fungi that produce
aflatoxins, already plague human society. There is little doubt, given
the fiscal resources available to the military establishments of major
industrial nations and the new developments in biotechnology, that new
2001]
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such as anthrax 41 and smallpox,42 with their extremely high mortality
rates, could spawn global epidemics. For example:
An attack involving a biologic agent, particularly if
released unannounced, will not be evident until individuals
feeling ill, probably with flu like symptoms, begin
presenting to their physicians' offices, emergency rooms,
and health clinics. Because disease undergoes an
incubation period, this could be days or even weeks after
the attack which would have been colorless, odorless, and
soundless. If the agent used causes its victims to become
infectious, as does smallpox, and was released in a major
city with a major airport, the disease could become
pandemic, worldwide, in a matter of a few days. Within
variants of these and many other harmful organisms can be generated.
Despite their development in the name of national security, the
existence of such organisms is likely to increase significantly the risk of
their use and decrease national and international security.
Id. For an example of how scientists modify bacteria to make them even more
resistant to treatment, see A.P. Pomerantsev et at., Expression of Cereolysine ab
Genes in Bacillus Anthracis Vaccine Strain Ensures Protection Against
Experimental Hemolytic Anthrax Infection, 15 VACCINE 1846, 1850 (1997).
41 Anthrax is of great concern to the infectious disease community:
Anthrax causes an illness that looks like flu, followed by shock and
death. The mortality rate is about 95% without treatment and 80% with
treatment. An estimate of the consequences of a 100 pound release of
anthrax spores from a Piper cub over Washington is a mortality
substantially higher than the nuclear bomb on Hiroshima. It would, in
essence, be a medical disaster in size and scope unlike anything ever
seen.
Bioterrorism, supra note 1 (statement of John G. Bartlett, M.D., Chief,
Infectious Diseases Division, John Hopkins University School of Medicine).
42 Smallpox is another disease health care providers are concerned about, because:
[U]nlike anthrax, it is highly contagious. This disease was eliminated
from the globe in 1976 under the leadership of D.A. Henderson. Thus,
no one has seen a case in 23 years. Smallpox vaccinations have been
discontinued so that nearly all persons on earth are now susceptible to
the disease. The mortality rate is about 30%. Most of us in the
infectious disease community believe that a single case of smallpox in
1999 would terrify the health care system because of the possibility of a
global epidemic. An effective response would require hospitalization
of all patients in negative pressure rooms, vaccinations of thousands of
exposed or potentially exposed persons, and the probable need for
quarantine.
[Vol. 26:145
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our own national boundaries, given our highly mobile
society, the disease could also spread to several states in
mere hours.43
Biological agents, because they are generally colorless, odorless,
and tasteless, have the unique advantage of being difficult to detect before
release.44 Smallpox and anthrax in particular have "advantages in that
they can be grown reasonably easily and in large quantities and are sturdy
organisms that 'are resistant to destruction. They are especially suited to
aerosol dissemination to reach large areas and numbers of people., 45 As if
these characteristics were not bad enough, scientists have tinkered with
these diseases to make them even more resistant to treatment.46 In sum,
these biological agents are the perfect weapons-lethal to the masses
while at the same time difficult to counteract and destroy.
Congress has attempted to restrict access to biological weapons
through two statutes. 47 The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of
1989 seeks to punish those who knowingly create or transfer biological
agents or toxins for the purpose of using these items in biological
warfare.48 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
which restricted access to biological agents even further, supplemented
this law.49 However, the effect of these laws is diluted by the fact that
43Bioterrorism, supra note 1 (statement of Michael T. Osterholm, Ph.D., Chairman and
CEO, Infection Control Advisory Network).
44Bioterrorism: Domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction, Special Joint Hearing Before
the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee and Senate Subcomm. On Labor, Health and
Human Services, Education and Related Services of the Senate Committee on
Appropriations, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Bioterrorism: Domestic] (statement of
Donald A. Henderson, M.D., director, Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, the Johns
Hopkins University).
45 Id.
46 See Pomerantsev, supra note 40.
47For a discussion of the current status of federal law concerning biological warfare, see
Heather A. Dagen, Bioterrorism: Perfectly Legal, 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 535 (2000). See
Atlas, supra note 39 (describing the government's current regulatory scheme).
48 See Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 175 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998).
49See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
511, 110 Stat. 1284. The statute strengthened the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism
Act of 1989 by expanding the definition of "infectious substance" to "infectious
substance, or biological product that may be engineered as a result of biotechnology, or
any naturally occurring component or bioengineered component of any such
microorganism, virus, infectious substance, or biological product." Id. § 511(b). The
statute also provided that the Secretary of Health will maintain a list of potentially
2001]
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individuals must have the intent to use the biological agents. Individuals
could escape liability by claiming that they never intended to use the
microbes for biological warfare.5 0 Short of a planned conspiracy, it would
be difficult to show intent without the microbes actually being released
into the environment.
Unfortunately, the current public health infrastructure is also
unprepared to deal with a bioterrorism event releasing microbial agents
into the general public.5' The frontline response against an outbreak
would fall onto local health care providers. 52 These providers, who are
currently untrained in how to respond to such an emergency, are
themselves at risk of falling to the very disease they would be trying to
combat.5 3 Were that to happen, it is likely that little could be done to
further prevent an epidemic.
This Note does not presuppose that using the patent system to limit
access to the information necessary to make more dangerous biological
agents would remove the threat of biological warfare and the need for the
public health system's preparedness. Strengthening the public health care
system through enhanced training and better equipment is essential to
fighting any outbreak that may occur.54 This Note does argue, however,
dangerous biological agents, further clarifying what counted as infectious agents under
the act. Id. § 511 (d).
50 The statute provides in relevant part that "[w]hoever knowingly develops, produces,
stockpiles, transfers, acquires, retains or possesses any biological agent, toxin, or delivery
system for use as a weapon.. ." 18 U.S.C. § 175.
5 See Bioterrorism, supra note 1 (statement of Michael T. Osterholm, Ph.D., Chairman
and CEO, Infection Control Advisory Network) (asking "[a]re state public health
departments ready for such a scenario [as bioterrorism]? The simple answer is no").
52 See id. (statement of Jeffrey P. Koplan, M.D., Director, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention) (commenting that "[t]he initial response to such a biological attack on
civilians is likely to be made by the public health community rather than by the military
or emergency responders").
53 See id. (statement of Richard L. Alcorta, M.D., State EMS Medical Director for the
Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems).
Most vulnerable to a biologic release are the EMS response personnel,
the primary health care/family practitioner, and the emergency
department physicians and staff. This is the infrastructure of our
national health care safety network. Without a real-time identification
of a highly infectious biologic organism, this critical cadre of
physicians and health care professionals, as well as the health care
system will be seriously, if not fatally, crippled.
Id.
See id. (statement of Jeffrey P. Koplan, M.D., Director, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention) (stating that "increased vigilance and preparedness for unexplained
[Vol. 26:145
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that limiting access to biological agents and the information necessary to
improve them, combined with a proper response from the health care
system, could greatly reduce the effectiveness of bioterrorism. These
combined efforts represent the best means of dealing with these potential
threats.55
III. CURRENT CONTROLS ON BIOTECHNOLOGY
A. Current Regulation of Biotechnology
The regulation of biotechnology within the United States is
currently a decentralized regime dividing its jurisdiction among a variety
of organizations. In 1986, the Office of Science and Technology created
the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology.5 6 This
coordinated framework split responsibility for regulating biotechnology
among the Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), the
National Institute of Health, and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("OSHA").57
Primary jurisdiction for each of these agencies is based on
statutory authority. For example, the Department of Agriculture controls
the movement of genetically modified plants under the Federal Plant Pest
Act58 and the Plant Quarantine Act.5 9  The EPA similarly claims
jurisdiction over genetically engineered organisms based on the Federal
illnesses is an essential part of the public health effort to protect the American people
against bioterrorism").
5 See id. (statement of Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D., Assistant Secretary for Planning
and Evaluation, Department of Health and Human Services).
Measures that will deter or prevent bioterrorism will be far and away
the most cost effective means to counter such threats to public health
and social order. Among the activities that need to be initiated are
efforts to control access to and handling of dangerous pathogens,
including proactive measures by the scientific community to monitor
more closely the facilities and procedures surrounding the use of such
biological agents.
Id.
56 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June
26, 1986).
57 Id.
58 7 U.S.C. §§ 150 aa-jj (1994).
59 Id. §§ 151-167. The Department of Agriculture also claims jurisdiction over some
veterinary biologics under the Virus Serum Toxin Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-158 (1994).
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Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 60 and the Toxic Substances
Control Act. 6 1 OSHA even claims some jurisdiction under the Occupation
Safety and Health Act of 1970.62 The problem with these various
individual statutes, used as the basis for the regulation of biotechnology, is
that none of these laws were designed to regulate biotechnology. 6  In
addition, due to overlapping jurisdiction of the statutes, it is difficult to
determine which agency is actually in control. 64
An advantage of this coordinated framework is that each agency
can have expertise in a very specific area. For example, the EPA is
capable of employing experts in the field of pesticide biotechnology
products. Additional agencies in control of the decisions also means that
it is harder for any one individual to influence all of the agencies, as
opposed to lobbying one central agency to further an individual's agenda.
In accordance with this principle, additional agencies in control gives
individuals more opportunities to be heard in the policy making process.65
A decentralized coordinated framework scheme is not without its
disadvantages. 66 With power being allocated among a variety of different
60 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y.
61 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1994).
62 See 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994).
63 See Valerie M. Fogleman, Regulating Science: An Evaluation of the Regulation of
Biotechnology Research, 17 ENVTL. L. 183, 234 (1987).
See id.
65 The Administrative Procedures Act requires that "the agency shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." 5 U.S.C. §
553 (1994). With each agency being required to take comments from interested
individuals when promulgating a new rule, an individual has more opportunities to be
heard by participating in each agency's individual discussion. Note, however, that the
Department of Agriculture uses formal rulemaking under § 556 of the Administrative
Procedures Act to regulate biotechnology as opposed to notice and comment rulemaking
under § 553. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,302, 23,352 (June 26, 1986).
66 Despite the overall controls of the Coordinated Framework, the framework itself
envisions that individual agencies will take the lead in regulation. See id. at 23,303.
To the extent possible, responsibility for a product use will lie with a
single agency. Where regulatory oversight or review for a particular
product is to be performed by more that one agency, the policy
establishes a lead agency, and consolidated or coordinated reviews.
While this preamble seeks to convey an overview of the coordinated
framework it must be noted that the regulatory requirements are highly
technical; reliance only on the simplified summary statements herein
could be misleading and, thus, the agency policy statements must be
consulted for specific details.
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agencies, it becomes harder to maintain government oversight over the
regulation of biotechnology. Essentially, it becomes difficult to keep track
of what each individual agency is doing. A variety of agencies making
different decisions on the regulation of biotechnology could also lead to
incoherencies and gaps in the doctrine. 67 The framework itself has been
criticized as being inflexible due to the variety of regulations involved and
its high susceptibility to influence by the Executive Branch.68 In addition,
creating unified policy may be more difficult with additional agencies
involved, as it is far easier to lobby a single agency as opposed to several.
If a person's agenda is actually beneficial to the science of biotechnology,
it may then be a problem to seek approval from all of the various agencies
that regulate the different aspects of biotechnology. Thus, this framework
may run to the contrary of having an actual uniform government policy on
the use of biotechnology that is consistent and predictable.
B. Statutes Used to Control the Dissemination of Scientific
Information
The United States uses several different statutes to attempt to
restrict the flow of information that threatens national security from falling
into the wrong hands. These statutes range from having extremely broad
prohibitions, such as in the Export Administration Act, which allows for
the restriction on the exportation of essentially any materials that could
affect national security, to the narrow range of the Atomic Energy Act,
which is limited to information conceming the atomic and nuclear
sciences. This Note argues that outside of the ISA, which is discussed in
detail in Section IV, the other statutes that regulate the dissemination of
technical information are generally ineffective in dealing with the
problems presented by biotechnology.
1. The Espionage and Sabotage Act of 195469
The Espionage and Sabotage Act ("ESA"), which imposes a very
general control over the dissemination of information, is essentially
designed to prevent military secrets from being transmitted to foreign
Id.
67 But see id. (arguing that "[t]he agencies will seek to operate their programs in an
integrated and coordinated fashion and together should cover the full range of plants,
animals, and microorganisms derived by the new genetic engineering techniques").
68 See Fogleman, supra note 63, at 232-36.
69 18 U.S.C. §§ 794, 2151-56 (1994).
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agents. This statute could apply to biotechnology under a broad
interpretation of what is "information relating to the national defense.,
70
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not clarified whether this broad
standard could be applied. In Gorin v. United States,71 the Court defined
the national defense as "a generic concept of broad connotations, referring
to the military and naval establishments and the related activities of
national preparedness." 72  Just what constitutes those activities of
preparedness, however, is left for a jury to decide.73 Thus the application
of the ESA is dependent wholly on the factual circumstances, and would
be difficult to apply when lay people are asked to evaluate the impact of
complex technical information on national security. Certainly a system in
which experts evaluate new technologies for potential threats before those
technologies are released would be more effective than after the fact
judicial controls. 74
The ESA suffers from several problems when it is applied in the
context of dangerous biotechnology. One such problem is the fact that it
is limited to transmission of information to foreign countries or agents.75
Bioterrorism, on the other hand, is also a domestic concern that the Act
cannot affect. This statute may also have problems with improvement
patents that expand upon an older invention. If an older invention was not
restricted, then this act may not affect or notice the potential of any
improvements to the older, unrestricted information. Finally, a key
element is that there must be an intentional dissemination of the
information with a desire to willfully harm the United States. 76 It would
be difficult to argue, however, that simply publishing scientific
70 Id. § 794(a).
71 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
72 Id. at 28.
73 The Court stated that "[t]he question of the connection of the information with national
defense is a question of fact to be determined by the jury as negligence upon undisputed
facts is determined." Id. at 32.
74 The option of secrecy orders allows evaluation by the appropriate defense agency,
encouraging expert review of the technology. See 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1994 & Supp. V
1999); see also infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (discussing the designation of
other agencies as defense agencies under the ISA).
75 See 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
76 The statute provides in relevant part that "[w]hoever, with intent or reason to believe
that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign
nation, communicates.. ." Id.
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information in a foreign journal is evidence of intent to harm the United
States."
2. The Export Administration Act of 197978
The Export Administration Act ("EAA"), different in scope from
the espionage statute, allows control of the nation's exports as necessary
for national security. It requires the Secretary of Commerce, in
cooperation with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate agencies,
to establish a list of all goods and technologies that should be subject to
export controls.79 Regulations then require that a license be granted by the
Secretary of Commerce to export any of these controlled goods or
technologies.80
Similar to the ESA, the EAA is limited in its scope to the export of
technology abroad.8' This statute, therefore, is fairly ineffective in
preventing dangerous technologies from becoming available domestically.
Another problem with the EAA is that it requires prior identification of the
threatening technology before it can be placed upon the control list. While
the Act has means by which technologies are evaluated for their potential
impact on national security, 82 there is no stipulation that these advisors
search out all new technologies for their impacts. However, when coupled
with the advance reviews of the technology from secrecy orders from the
ISA, 83 the EAA could be an effective statute to prevent dangerous
technologies from falling into the wrong hands.
77 It has also been argued that due to the differences in language between sections 794(a)
and 794(b), and the omission of the term "publish" from section 794(a), communications
to foreign nationals do not include publications. See Roger Funk, National Security
Controls on the Dissemination of Privately Generated Scientific Information, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 405 (1982).
78 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-20 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
79Id. § 2404(c). This Commodity Control List is subject to quarterly review, with all
foods and technology on the list reviewed at least once per year. Id.
15 C.F.R. § 740 (2001).
81 The regulations do have a broad definition of what an export is. For example, the
"release of technology to a foreign national in the United States through such means as
demonstration or oral briefing is deemed an export." Id. § 730.5. Unfortunately, even
these broad definitions are still concerned with foreign nationals and countries, so no
consideration is given as to hoe the technology might be used by American citizens. Id.
82 50 U.S.C. § 2404(h). These Technical Advisory Committees are formed at the request
of a producer whose technology is subject to or being considered for an export control.
15 C.F.R. § 730.10(b).
83 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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3. Arms Export Control Act
8 4
The Arms Export Control Act ("AECA") is the other major export
measure designed to prevent the exportation of, and foreign contact with,
military technology.85  Like the EAA, the AECA sets forth a list of
materials8 6 that may not be exported without permission and license of the
Secretary of State.
The AECA suffers from the same problems as the EAA does when
applied to the context of the proliferation of dangerous biotechnology.
88
The scope of the statute is limited to activities involving foreign nationals
and countries, so domestic concerns are not addressed.8 9  Though the
AECA encompasses technical information,90  including technical
information that is not classified,91 that technology must have "significant
military or intelligence applicability." 92 In addition, information within
the public domain is not covered under the AECA.93 When defining the
public domain, 94 basic fundamental research at universities has been
84 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2976 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
85 Id. §2751; 22 C.F.R. § 120.1 (2001).
86 The compilation was entitled the United States Munitions List, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a).
This list excludes all items that are included in the Commodity Control List as part of the
EAA. Id.; 22 C.F.R. § 120.4.
87 22 U.S.C. § 2778; 22 C.F.R. § 123.2.
88The AECA has been recently challenged as unconstitutional on its face. In Bernstein
v. U.S. Dep 't of State, a mathematician challenged the legitimacy of the Act as applied to
cryptographic computer source code. 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996). The district
court held that the licensing requirements for speech relating to encryption of computer
software was an unlawful prior restraint, but that the scheme of the act as a whole was not
overly broad. Id.
89 22 U.S.C. § 2778; 22 C.F.R. § 120.17. Note that "[d]isclosing (including oral or visual
disclosure) or transferring technology to a foreign person, whether in the United States or
abroad" counts as an export. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17.
90 22 C.F.R. § 125. Requests for a license are required whenever the technical
information to be exported exceeds that which is required to support a domestic filing of
a patent application when no domestic application has been filed. Id. § 125.2(b). Note
that the filing of foreign patent applications is covered by the Invention Secrecy Act and
foreign filing licenses granted by the Patent Office. See infra notes 164-71 and
accompanying text; see also id. § 125.2.
91 See id.
92 Id. § 120.3(b). Note that the intended use of the technology is not considered relevant
to the controls of the Act. Id. at § 120.
9322 C.F.R. § 125.1(a).
94Id. § 120.11.
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excluded from the statute if it is common to publish the results. 95 Thus in
the biotechnology context, where basic discoveries may have many
potential applications, the AECA would not prevent the distribution of the
technology.
4. Atomic Energy Act of 195496
The Atomic Energy Act ("AEA") is a good example of a narrowly
tailored statute designed to control very specific and threatening technical
information. The act is designed to prevent access to and dissemination of
information concerning atomic energy and weapons.97 This concern for
the danger of atomic weapons and fuels was carried over into the ISA,
where references are constantly made to the Atomic Energy
Commissioner and his ability to decide whether the patent would be
detrimental to national security. 98 Similar to the ISA, the restrictions of
the dissemination of information can apply to both classified and
unclassified sources. 99 Unfortunately, when applied to the context of
biotechnology, the AEA lends no support to preventing the proliferation of
dangerous biotechnology.
IV. USING THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM TO CONTROL
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS BIOTECHNOLOGY
A. General Overview of the United States Patent System
Patents are granted in consideration of a fundamental bargain
between the Patent Office, representing the general welfare of the people,
and the inventor. Inventors are given a limited monopoly in order to
exclude others from making or using their invention for a limited time.100
93 Id. § 120.11(a)(8).
96 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
97 Id. § 2013.
98 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
99 Id. § 181; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2161-68. The AEA has been criticized for failing to
distinguish between classified and unclassified information as private scientists are
unaware of whether the information that they are working with would be restricted until
the government informs them of such. See Funk, supra note 77, at 433.
100The current term of utility and plant patents is twenty years from the date of filing the
application (or of any earlier filed application to which the patent application claims
priority). 35 U.S.C. § 154. Design patents, however, only have a term of fourteen years.
Id. § 173. Given that the term of the utility patent is measured from the date of filing, the
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In exchange, the inventor must disclose how to make and use the
invention to the public.
0 1
Patent applications will only be granted for inventions that are
considered patentable subject matter.'0 2 Originally, living matter such as
biotechnology was not considered patentable subject matter. 10 3  The
Supreme Court, however, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,10 4 has since taken a
very liberal stance as to what constitutes patentable subject matter. This
current standard is extremely broad, providing that "anything under the
sun modified by man" is patentable.' ° 5 Though plants and seeds enjoy
separate consideration for patentability under the Plant Patent Act'0 6 and
imposition of a secrecy order would be very relevant to the life of the patent. Patentees
can file to have the term for which the secrecy order was in effect added back to their
patent's life, as discussed infra notes 164-66.
101 35 U.S.C. § 112.
102 The statute provides that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title." Id. § 101.
103 See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) (holding that a
mixture of bacteria with properties that were not thought to be possible in nature was not
patentable as it was not an invention, but rather a discovery of a phenomenon of nature).
The Supreme Court stated that "[h]e who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomena of
nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be
invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature
to a new and useful end." Id. at 130.
104 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that living, engineered microorganisms are patentable
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
105 Id. at 309. This view has also been embraced by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
The plain and unambiguous meaning of section 101 is that any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may be patented if it meets the
requirements for patentability set forth in Title 35, such as those found
in sections 102, 103 and 112. The use of the expansive term "any" in
section 101 represents Congress's intent not to place any restrictions on
the subject matter for which a patent may be obtained beyond those
specifically recited in section 101 and other parts of Title 35.
Id. at 1542.
106 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-64. Applicants have a choice when filing a patent for plants or
seeds, provided the plant has been asexually reproduced, regarding whether they will
seek a utility patent or a plant patent. Though the patent terms are the same, the
disclosure requirements are somewhat more relaxed for plant patents than utility patents.
Id. §§ 161-62. Note that tuber propagated plants are specifically exempted from the Plant
Patent Act. Id.
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the Plant Variety Protection Act, 107 they may still be eligible for the more
general utility patent provided the application can satisfy the necessary
disclosure requirements. I10 The Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences has also since declared animals statutory subject matter for
patents. 10 9  In essence, the simple fact that the invention concerns
biotechnology presents no problem in patenting the invention.110
In order to receive a patent, an invention must satisfy three
additional requirements. The invention must be useful,"1 novel,1 2 and
non-obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was
made. 1 3 Novelty considers whether the invention was known to others
before the invention thereof by the inventor. 114 Provided that the inventor
has actually created something new, this provision presents no special
limitations to the granting of biotechnology patents.
The patent statute requires that patents not only be "new" but that
they must also be "useful."' 1 5 Utility, however, is generally not a barrier
to patentability. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has stated that "[w]hen a
properly claimed invention meets at least one stated objective, utility
under [35 U.S.C.] § 101 is clearly shown. ' 16 As established in Brenner v.
Manson, the specification must, however, establish that the invention has
some specific utility.1 17 The Federal Circuit seems to have clarified that
107 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1994).
18 See Exparte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 443 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1985).
109 See Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987) (holding
that polyploid oysters, wholly created by man, were proper subject matter).
110 This is not to say that anything and everything can be patented. Mathematical
formulas and purely natural phenomena are still excepted from protection. See, e.g.,
Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Feed Co. v. Kato Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130;
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112-21 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 156, 175 (1853). The AEA also provides that "[n]o patent shall be granted for any
invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material
or atomic energy in an atomic weapon." 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
11135 U.S.C. §101.
112 Id. § 102.
113 Id. § 103.
114Id. § 102.
115Id. § 101.
116 Raytheon v. Roper, 724 F.2d 951, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See In re Gottlieb, 328 F.2d
1016, 1019 (CCPA 1964) (stating that "[h]aving found that the antibiotic is useful for
some purpose, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether it is in fact useful for the other
furposes 'indicated' in the specification as possibly useful").
17 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966). The Court stated that:
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what is required to show specific utility is a low threshold, when it held in
In re Brana that a compound whose only demonstrated utility was tumor
reduction in mice was sufficient utility.' 18 In addition, lack of utility is not
fatal to the application if it is apparent to a person of ordinary skill that the
invention would have a well-established utility." 19 Thus, utility is a fairly
low standard that is unlikely to be used to deny a patent application.
The final condition for patentability is that the invention must be
non-obvious in light of the prior art at the time of conception of the
invention. The basic test for determining non-obviousness was set out in
Graham v. John Deere Co., 120 in which the Supreme Court stated that
"[u]nder § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be
ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved."'
2
'
The Court further stated that "such secondary considerations as
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.,
might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin
of the subject matter sought to be patented."' 122 These secondary
considerations can be used to show that the invention was non-obvious at
the time the invention was conceived.
The actual filing of a patent application is a rigorous negotiation
between the inventor and the patent prosecution section of the Patent
Office. The minimum requirements for filing an application consist of a
specification of the invention, any drawings that may be necessary to
understand the invention, an oath executed by the inventor, and specific
The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the
Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the
public from an invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a
process is refined and developed to this point- where the specific
benefit exists in currently available form- there is insufficient
justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to
be a broad field.
Id. at 534-35. See In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that a
disclosure for a composition that is "plasitic-like" was not sufficient to specify a utility
for the invention); In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (CCPA 1967) (commenting that a new class
of steroids that are biologically active is not sufficiently described to be useful).
118 In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (commenting that "these tumor
models represent a specific disease against which the claimed compounds are alleged to
be effective. Accordingly . . . appellants' specification alleges a sufficiently specific
use.").
119 See In re Folkers, 344 F.2d 970 (CCPA 1965).
120 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
121 Id. at 17.
122 Id. at 17-18.
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claims as to what exactly the inventor regards as his invention.' 23 The
specification is a written description of the invention, and it must also
include descriptions of how to make and use the invention as well as the
best mode of the invention known to the inventor at the time of filing.
24
The specification must be enabling to one skilled in the art such that they
would not have to engage in "undue experimentation" to arrive at the
subject matter claimed. I The written description requirement is separate
from the enablement requirement of how to make and use the invention.126
B. Secrecy Orders and The Invention Secrecy Act of 1951
1. Definition and Procedure for Issuing a Secrecy Order
The Commissioner of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office 127 has the power to withhold the issuance of patents for a limited
duration due to national security concerns. 28 The statute contemplates
two different types of inventions, those that the government has a property
interest in and those that the government has no property interest in, but
123 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Note that the required oath is not necessary
when filing an application to establish a filing date and priority. Id.
124 Id. § 112.
125 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The court stated that:
The term "undue experimentation" does not appear in the statute, but it
is well established that enablement requires that the specification teach
those in the art to make and use the invention without undue
experimentation. Whether undue experimentation is needed is not a
single, simple factual determination, but rather is a conclusion reached
by weighing many factual considerations.
Id.
126 See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating
that "[tihe purpose of the 'written description' requirement is broader than to merely
explain how to 'make and use;' the applicant must also convey with reasonable clarity to
those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the
invention").
127 The Commissioner of Patents is a position appointed by the Secretary of Commerce.
35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(2). Prior to 1999, the Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark office
had the authority to withhold patents for national security reasons. In 1999, the American
Inventors Protection Act modified that position, elevating it to the newly formed
Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office. See 35 U.S.C. § 3. The Commissioner of Patents oversees
the issuance of applications that may be subject to a secrecy order. See id. §§ 3, 181.
128 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-88.
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that may also be detrimental to the national security. 129  When the
Commissioner believes that the invention may be detrimental to the
national security, he or she will make the application available to the
appropriate defense agency for inspection.' 30  If it is the opinion of the
chief officer of the appropriate defense agency, after review of the patent
application, that the invention "would be detrimental to the national
security," the chief officer will notify the Commissioner to order the
invention kept secret. 131
When the Commissioner issues a secrecy order on a pending patent
application, prosecution of the application will continue as normal. 132
129 Section 181 of the ISA states in relevant part that:
Whenever publication or disclosure by the publication of an
application or by grant of a patent on an invention in which the
Government has a property interest might, in the opinion of the head
of the interested Government agency, be detrimental to the national
security, the Commissioner of Patents upon being so notified shall
order that the invention be kept secret and shall withhold the
publication of the application or the grant of a patent therefore under
the conditions set forth hereinafter.
Whenever the publication or disclosure of an invention by the
publication of an application or by the granting of a patent, in which
the Government does not have a property interest, might, in the
opinion of the Commissioner of Patents, be detrimental to the
national security, he shall make the application for patent in which
such invention is disclosed available for inspection to the Atomic
Energy Commission, the Secretary of Defense, and the chief officer
of any other department or agency of the Government designated by
the President as a defense agency of the United States.
Id. § 181.
130 Id. Defense agencies under the ISA currently include: the Department of Defense, 35
U.S.C. § 181; the Department of Energy (as successor to the Atomic Energy
Commission), 42 U.S.C. § 5908(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); the Department of Justice,
Exec. Order No. 10,457, 3 C.F.R. 943-44 (1949-53); and most recently the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 42 U.S.C. § 2457(i) (1994).
131 35 U.S.C. § 181.
132 37 C.F.R. § 5.3 (2000). Note that as all patent applications are maintained
confidentially during their applications pendancy, there are no further concerns of secrecy
even though the prosecution continues. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (stating that "applications for
patents shall be kept in confidence by the Patent and Trademark Office and no
information concerning the same given without authority of the applicant or owner unless
necessary to carry out... an Act of Congress or in such special circumstances as may be
determined by the Director"). As an added measure, all pending applications subject to a
security order are also examined by a special patent examining group (Group 3640). U.S.
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 130 (7th ed. rev. 2000) [hereinafter PATENT MANUAL].
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Applicants are still responsible for prosecuting or appealing any final
rejections 133 the application may receive.' 34 However, hearings for any
appeals will not be heard unless specially ordered by the Commissioner.1
National applications that are placed in condition for allowance will be
held in a "condition of suspension until the secrecy order is removed."'
36
International applications subject to a secrecy order will be processed as a
normal application up until the point when they are to be sent to the
international authorities, but no information will be forwarded to those
authorities. 137 In addition, no interferences 138 will be declared involving
applications subject to a secrecy order. 139
Secrecy orders come in one of three forms, depending on the need
to protect the application's disclosure from discovery. The first, the
"Secrecy Order and Permit for Foreign Filing in Certain Countries", is tied
to the AECA and EAA.140 It is "intended to permit the widest utilization
of the technical data in the patent application while still controlling any
publication or disclosure which would result in an unlawful
exportation.' 14 1 This type of order allows the application to be filed in
certain countries in which the United States has reciprocal security
agreements.' 42 The second type of order, the "Secrecy Order and Permit
for Disclosing Classified Information," is "to be used for those patent
applications which contain technical data that is properly classified or
classifiable" with no government interest.' 43 If the applicant has a current
133 Final rejection is a special type of rejection of a patent application an examiner can
give to an application that has been examined at least twice. Final rejection limits the
applicants ability to amend or appeal the rejection. 37 C.F.R. § 1.113.
Id. § 5.3.
135 Id. § 5.3(a).
136Id. § 53(c).137 Id. § 5.3(d).
138An "interference" is a proceeding within the Patent and Trademark Office whereby
the priority, or who invented the invention first, is disputed between a pending patent
application and another application or patent that has already been issued. See 35 U.S.C.
135 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
39 37 C.F.R. § 5.3.
140 See PATENT MANUAL, supra note 132, § 120.
141 Id.
142 Id. "Countries with which the United States has reciprocal security agreements
include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United
Kingdom." Id. Note that applications under a secrecy order cannot be filed directly with
the European Patent Office and must be instead filed with the individual countries. Id.
143 Id.
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Department of Defense Security Agreement, then "this secrecy order
allows disclosure of the technical information as if it were classified."' 144
This order is intended "to treat classified technical data presented as a
patent application in the same manner as any other classified material."' 145
The final type of secrecy order, which is only referred to as "Secrecy
Order," is a catchall class that "is used where the other types of Orders do
not apply. ' 146  As the applicant in this type of order does not have a
security agreement with the Department of Defense, this order prevents
the applicant from disclosing the invention to anyone without prior
consent of the Commissioner. 17
Once a patent application is ordered secret, the Commissioner will
notify the applicant of the order. 48 This notice creates an obligation on
the part of the applicant not to disclose the invention to others for the
duration of the order. Failure to obey a secrecy order results in
abandonment of the patent application 49 and, in more extreme cases, can
result in a fine and imprisonment.15 0
Secrecy orders are, by nature, limited in duration. They are given
for one-year periods that are extendable annually upon a showing by the
appropriate agency head requesting the secrecy order that national interest
continues to require the security.15 ' The Commissioner can terminate
these orders prematurely if national security interests no longer exist.'5 2
144 PATENT MANUAL, supra note 132.
145 Id.
146Id.
147 Id.
148 35 U.S.C. § 181.
149 Id. § 182.
150Id. § 186. The maximum penalty for violation of a secrecy order, upon conviction, is
a fine of up to $10,000, up to two years imprisonment, or both. Id. This penalty requires
knowledge of the secrecy order and willful disclosure or authorization of the disclosure
of the invention, which is a higher standard than that required to abandon the invention
which can happen through inadvertent disclosure. See id. §§ 182, 186. Note that these
penalties do not apply to officers or agents of the United States who are acting within the
scope of their employment. Id. § 187.
151 35 U.S.C. § 181. An exception exists for secrecy orders issued during times when the
United States is at war. When at war, the order remains in effect for the duration of the
hostilities plus an additional year thereafter. Id. An additional exception exists for
secrecy orders issued during a national emergency declared by the President. Such orders
will remain in effect for the duration of the national emergency and an additional six
months thereafter. Id.
152 Id.
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One complaint against secrecy orders is that they are too harsh on
inventors. 153 Recently, secrecy orders have been increasingly issued on
technologies that can be used for commercial as well as military
purposes.154 The increased use of secrecy has also hampered the transfer
of non-threatening technologies from the military sector to the commercial
sector.' The Pentagon has not turned a deaf ear to these complaints and
is working to address the problem.' 56 Applicants whose patents have been
withheld due to the implication of a secrecy order have a legal right to
compensation. 5 7 The ISA provides that:
153 See Morning Edition: Patenting Office Tries to Silence Inventors (NPR radio
broadcast, Sept. 14, 1992). During the broadcast, it was noted that:
Every year, about 80,000 Americans apply for patents, and for the past
few years, several hundred of them have gotten back an ominous-
looking letter from the US Patent and Trademark Office. Across the
top of the letter in heavy black letters stand the words "secrecy order."
This means the Patent Office sent the application over to the Pentagon,
where officials decided it should be treated like a military secret even if
the inventor had no military use in mind. This may seem like a
remnant of the Cold War and it is. The Invention Secrecy Act was
passed in 1951 at the height of the McCarthy era. For an inventor, a
secrecy order is bad news.
Id.
154 See Edmund L. Andrews, Patents: Cold War Secrecy Still Shrouds Inventions, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 1992, at 35. The article mentioned that:
The biggest growth in secrecy orders has not been those imposed on
military secrets, like the blueprints for making nuclear weapons, but
rather from "dual use" technologies that can be used for both
commercial and military purposes. These can range from certain kinds
of computer hardware to advanced ceramic materials, laser systems,
semiconductor manufacturing technologies and automated process
control systems.
Id.
155 See Ralph Vartabedian, Most Promising U.S. Technology Still Kept Secret, L.A.
TIMES, July 13, 1993, at Al (stating that "[i]f the military services continue to classify
industry's most promising technology, they risk posing a formidable obstacle to... [the]
effort to help the defense industry convert to commercial enterprises..
156 See Teresa Riordan, Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at D2.
In response to complaints from industry and scientific groups over a
sharp rise in secrecy orders during the 1980's, the Pentagon appears to
have begun to slow the number of new secrecy orders issued. During
the first half of the 1993 fiscal year, 112 such orders were issued, in
contrast to an annual high of 847 orders in 1989, according to figures
from the Federation of American Scientists.
Id.
157 35 U.S.C. § 183.
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An applicant, his successors, assigns, or legal
representatives, whose patent is withheld as herein
provided, shall have the right. . . to apply to the head of
any department or agency who caused the order to be
issued for compensation for the damage caused by the
order of secrecy and/or for the use of the invention by the
Government, resulting from his disclosure. 
58
These damages cannot be for an invention whose primary purpose is for
military use. 59 There are, however, several ways in which damages can
be calculated so it is unclear what measure of compensation an inventor
will receive under the ISA.16°
Applicants whose patents are subject to security orders are not
without options., An applicant may first petition for the rescission of the
secrecy order.61 If rescission is not granted, the applicant may then
appeal to the Secretary of Commerce.' 6 2 An applicant may also file for
permission to modify the secrecy order to use parts of the disclosure for
other applications.'
63
Applicants are also not penalized in their patent term by having a
secrecy order levied on them. Normally, the term of a patent is twenty
years from the date of filing the application.' 64 Applications under secrecy
orders, however, are allowed to recover any time for which the application
is held pending under a secrecy order and may have that time added back
to their patent term. 165 The adjustment is measured on a day-to-day basis
so that the inventor does not lose any time he would have been entitled to
had the patent been issued without a secrecy order.1
66
158 Id.
159 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 670 F.2d 156, 163-64 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
160 For an excellent discussion of compensation under the ISA, see Gary L. Hausken, The
Value of a Secret: Compensation for Impositions of Secrecy Orders Under the Invention
Secrecy Act, 119 MIL. L. REV. 201 (1988).
161 37 C.F.R. § 5.4 (2000).
162 35 U.S.C. § 181; see id. § 5.4(d).
163 37 C.F.R. § 5.5.
164 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
165 Id. § 154(b). Patent terms can also be extended for the Patent and Trademark Office's
failure to take certain actions within specified time frames and the failure of the Patent
Office to issue a patent within three years of the actual filing date. Id.
166 Id.
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The only change needed to bring biotechnology patents fully
within the scope of secrecy orders is for the President to designate the
agencies that monitor and regulate biotechnology research as defense
agencies under the ISA. The review of patents for national security at the
appropriate agency extends to "any other department or agency of the
Government designated by the President as a defense agency of the United
States." 67 The extension of status as a defense agency, within the scope
of the ISA, is not a far stretch for the imagination when one considers the
role the Center for Disease Control plays in combating outbreaks of
disease, both natural and man-made. Prevention of epidemic disease
outbreaks is just as important to defending the national welfare as more
conventional armed services are. In fact, using other agencies may be
more appropriate than having the Department of Defense analyze the wide
variety of technologies. 68  Given that these other regulatory. agencies
claim their power in the name of public health and safety, designating
them as defense agencies for review of biotechnology patents is
completely reasonable given the potential threat that biotechnology can
represent to the national welfare.
2. Foreign Filing Licenses
Another part of the ISA that is separate but tied to the secrecy
order is the requirement of a license to file for a patent in a foreign country
for an invention conceived within the United States. 6 9 This license is
required regardless of whether the invention has any conceivable relation
to national security. If a foreign filing license is not obtained and a United
States patent issues for the invention, then that patent may be held
invalid. A foreign filing license, however, is rarely an obstacle to
16 7 /d. § 181.
168 See Riordan, supra note 156, at D2 (quoting, in an interview with Donald Singer,
chief of the patent division of the Air Force Legal Services, the comment that:
The military is supposed to review secrecy orders every year for a
given patent until it decides to rescind them, but this does not always
happen, Mr. Singer said. "It's an enormous administrative burden
heaped upon our technical people, who are responsible for doing a lot
of other jobs," Mr. Singer said. "No one is hired to do this as their
main job-not in the Air Force, anyway.").
Id.
169 35 U.S.C. § 184. For a general discussion of patent rights available in foreign
countries, see Margaret A. Boulware et al., An Overview of Intellectual Property Rights
Abroad, 16 Hous. J. INT'LL. 441 (1994).
170 Id. §§ 184-85.
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obtaining a patent and the license is easily acquired. Implicit within the
filing of a United States application is the request for a foreign filing
license.17 1 A license will also be considered to be automatically granted in
filing a patent application, provided that six months have passed since
filing and that the application is not subject to a secrecy order.' 72  In
addition, a license can be granted simply by filing a petition asking for
such a license, regardless of whether a United States application has been
filed or not.' 73 Finally, a foreign filing license can even be obtained and
then applied retroactively, even after the application issues, through a
petition, provided that the foreign filing occurred through error and
without deceptive intent.1
74
The foreign filing license is essentially an extension of the secrecy
order to patent applications in a foreign country. By declaring any United
States patent invalid without a foreign filing license, inventors are
discouraged from filing their inventions in foreign countries without first
consulting the Patent Office. The United States can also punish the
inventor for filing in the foreign country without a license,175 though this
extreme measure may violate Due Process requirements. 176
3. Advantages of Using Secrecy Orders to Prevent the Disclosure of
Potentially Threatening Inventions
The primary advantage of the imposition of the secrecy order is
that it allows for the front-end control of dangerous information. All
issued patent applications are available to any member of the public for
inspection. 177 It has been argued that criminal sanctions should be levied
171 37 C.F.R. § 5.12(a).
172 35 U.S.C. § 184; 37 C.F.R. § 5.11(e)(2).
173 37 C.F.R. § 5.13.
174 35 U.S.C. §184-85. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 366 F.2d 238,
240 (6th Cir. 1966) (holding that a retroactive license is valid for patents that have
already been issued). The petition for a retroactive license must include a list of every
foreign country and dates in which the information was filed, a verified statement that the
subject matter was not under a secrecy order at the time, and an explanation as to why the
material was filed abroad in error. 37 C.F.R. § 5.25.
17535 U.S.C. § 186.
176 See Allen M. Shinn, Jr., Note, The First Amendment and the Export Laws: Free
S eech on Scientific and Technical Matters, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 368, 402-03 (1990).
177 37 C.F.R. § 1.11.
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against those who would misuse biotechnology. 178 Unfortunately, this
would not solve all of the problems associated with biotechnology.
Essentially it is too late to control the distribution of the information of the
patent once it has been issued as a patent. Secrecy orders, however,
restrict access to the applications' disclosure for the duration of the
secrecy order.
The imposition of a secrecy order is also a proactive approach to
the problems posed by biotechnology. The extra time the government
would have due to the order would give the United States a head start to
counteract any potential problems. For example, the United States could
start work on vaccines before the actual threatening organisms become
public knowledge. This idea has been recently acknowledged in a
Pentagon study claiming that the United States is ill prepared for a
bioterrorism attack, but that one means to counter this deficit is to
withhold developed vaccines with patents. 179  Even if others later
independently discover the invention under the secrecy order, the time
saved through the secrecy order may be enough to make a difference in
the outcome. 1
80
The use of the secrecy order may also be the only means possible
by which the government can attempt to prevent the information from
being delivered into the wrong hands. If an applicant can satisfy the
Patent Office that the invention is for patentable subject material, and that
it is novel, useful, and non-obvious, then there is no reason why that
applicant should not receive a patent. 181 With the Chakrabarty decision
that essentially allows anything modified by man to be patentable, subject
178 See Richard Kevin Zepfel, Note, Stopping a "Gruesome Parade of Horribles":
Criminal Sanctions to Deter Corporate Misuse of Recombinant DNA Technology, 59 S.
CAL. L. REV. 641, 663-65 (1986).
179See Pamela Hess, US Not Ready for Bio-war Attack, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Sept. 27,
1999.
180 See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 994 (W.D. Wis. 1979)
(upholding an injunction against the release of information on how to construct a
hydrogen bomb).
The point has also been made that it is only a question of time before
other countries will have the hydrogen bomb. That may be true.
However, there are times in the course of human history when time
itself may be very important. This time factor becomes critical when
considering mass annihilation weaponry-witness the failure of Hitler
to get his V-1 and V-2 bombs operational quickly enough to materially
affect the outcome of World War II.
Id.
181 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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matter is no longer a barrier to patentability. 82 Utility is seldom a reason
for rejecting patents.' 8 3 Novelty should not be a factor if the inventor is
the first to invent the subject matter and does not wait past the statutory
time limits to file his patent application.184 Obviousness rejections can be
overcome by arguing secondary considerations that show the invention
was in fact non-obvious.1
85
Provided that the application then meets the aforementioned
requirements for patentability, there is no reason for the inventor to not
receive a patent. 86 Without secrecy orders, any invention satisfying that
criteria could be patented regardless of how dangerous the new technology
may be to society. Secrecy orders therefore allow the Patent Office to
analyze the technology for its potential impact on society and to withhold
patents for a limited time to inventions that are direct threats to the
national security.
It has been argued that the patent system is not the proper place to
analyze technology.' " However, it is the distinct role of the Patent Office
to determine whether inventions are new and useful when prosecuting
182 The Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980), was aware of the
potential dangers of biotechnology and stated that:
[T]he petitioner, with the support of amicus, points to grave risks that
may be generated by research endeavors such as respondent's. The
briefs present a gruesome parade of horribles. Scientists, among them
Nobel laureates, are quoted suggesting that genetic research may pose a
serious threat to the human race, or, at the very least, that the dangers
are far too substantial to permit such research to proceed apace at this
time. We are told that genetic research and related technological
developments may spread pollution and disease, that it may result in
the loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice may tend to depreciate
the value of human life. These arguments are forcefully, even
passionately presented; they remind us that, at times, human ingenuity
seems unable to control fully the forces it creates-that, with Hamlet, it
is sometimes better "to bear those ills we have than fly to others that we
know not of."
Id. Despite this the Court still gave an extremely broad standard of patentability that
included biotechnology. Id.
183 For a discussion on why utility is a minimal threshold to patentability, see supra notes
115-19 and accompanying text.
184 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (explaining the novelty and statutory bars for patents).
185 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
186 The patent application still needs an enabling disclosure. See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
187 Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and
Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REv. 1051, 1067-68 (1988).
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patent applications. 8 8 Requests for secrecy orders are also originated by
agencies outside of the Patent Office, 189 so that the use of these orders
does not detract from the Patent Office's fundamental mission.
V. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH USING THE INVENTION SECRECY ACT
TO PREVENT THE DISCLOSURE OF INVENTIONS
A. First Amendment Concerns
A secrecy order prevents the applicant or anyone with knowledge
of the application from disclosing the invention to others.' 90  Such a
restraint can be argued to have the effect of a prior restraint on an
applicant's right to free speech. There is, however, no obligation upon the
part of the United States to grant a patent to any individual. 191 Power to
grant a patent is given to the Congress in the Constitution. 92 That power
is, of course, tempered by the Bill of Rights.
Once a secrecy order is issued on an application, the inventor is
directed not to discuss his invention with anyone under the penalty of
law. 193 This requirement is a restraint on the inventor's speech. It is not
necessarily accurate to qualify that restraint as a "prior restraint," as the
inventor was not forced to file a patent and could have simply disclosed
his or her invention to the world, without ever consulting the United States
government. But once a secrecy order is given, the inventor is prevented
from disclosing his or her invention to anyone else for the duration of the
order. 194 In this sense the secrecy order has the effect of what is more
traditionally thought of as a prior restraint. 195
188 35 U.S.C. §§101-02.
189 See id. § 181.
190 Id.
191 See id. § 151 (providing that patent will be issued when "it appears that applicant is
entitled to patent under the law" and the payment of issue fees is made).
192 Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings ad Discoveries." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
193 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
Id.
195 See Peter Swan, A Road Map to Understanding Export Controls: National Security
in a Changing Global Environment, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 607, 633 (1993) (stating that
"[1]icensing controls operate prophylatically; they attempt to prevent certain
communications of restricted data before they occur").
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Surprisingly, there has been relatively little jurisprudence
concerning speech when related to national security interests. 96  The
Supreme Court first considered national security exceptions to the First
Amendment in Near v. Minnesota.'97 Chief Justice Hughes stated that
"the protection even as to prior restraint is not absolutely unlimited ....
No one would question but that a government might prevent actual
obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates
of transports or the number and location of troops."'19  While this
statement was made in dictum, it was the only pronouncement on the issue
for the following forty years.
The "Pentagon Papers" case' 99 brought the issue of a national
security exception to the First Amendment to the forefront. The United
States was seeking an injunction to prevent the publication of a classified
study on Vietnam policy.2°° The Court, in a six to three decision, opted
not to issue an injunction.20' In his concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Black, Justice Douglas stated that "[s]ecrecy in government is
fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open
,,202
debate and discussion of public issues are vital to the national health.
It is important, however, to keep this statement within the context of the
preceding paragraph of the opinion where Justice Douglas explained
"[t]he dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the
widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing
information." Thus it is easier to understand why Justice Douglas did
not find a need for an injunction in this case when he stated that a "debate
of large proportions goes on in the Nation over our posture in Vietnam. 2 °4
Justice Stewart, with whom Justice White joined in concurrence,
however, would have allowed a prior restraint for national security reasons
but for the fact that in his opinion the disclosure of the documents would
not "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our
196 For a general overview of jurisprudence related to the national security exception to
the First Amendment, see Martin L.C. Feldman, Why the First Amendment is not
Incompatible with National Security Interests: Maintaining a Constitutional Perspective,
HERITAGE FOUND. REP., January 14, 1997.
197283 U.S. 697 (1931).
198 Id. at 716 (citations omitted).
199 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
200 Id.
201 Id. at 714.
202 Id. at 724.
203 Id. at 723-24.
204 Id. at 724.
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Nation or its people." 20 5 Justice Stewart was aware of the need for a
national security exception when he stated, "the successful conduct of
international diplomacy and the maintenance of an effective national
defense require both confidentiality and secrecy."
20 6
The relevant standard to allow a prior restraint on information
based on national security seems to require "direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage". 20 7 What needs clarifying is just what the damage is.
If the damage is using the information to the detriment of the United
States, then many peacetime secrecy orders may be found
unconstitutional, as the threat is not immediate. However, if the damage is
simply that the information is released to the public, to be used by anyone
at any time, then the results would be immediate and secrecy orders
should be upheld as constitutional. This Note argues that the latter
position is correct as once the information has been disclosed to the public
through a patent, that information cannot be later removed from the public
domain. Hence the disclosure of the information is irreparable, and it
would be impossible to prevent any damage resulting from the disclosure
of the information.0 8 Secrecy orders should not be characterized as
impermissible prior restraints. However, it is certainly an unsettled point
of law as to exactly how far the national security exception to the First
Amendment extends.
20 9
205 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 730.
206 Id. at 728.
207 Id. at 703. See Sabing H. Lee, Protecting the Private Inventor Under the Peacetime
Provisions of the Invention Secrecy Act, 12 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 346, 395 (1997); Shinn,
supra, note 176, at 386-87. See also MORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL HOFFMAN,
FREEDOM V. NATIONAL SECURITY: SECRECY AND SURVEILLANCE 106-109 (1977)
(analyzing the opinions in the Pentagon Papers case).
This line of reasoning was followed in United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F.
Supp. 990 (1979), which applied the test from the Pentagon Papers case to uphold aninj unction against a magazine from publishing how to construct a hydrogen bomb. Id.
209 See Bruce E. Fein, Access to Classified Information: Constitutional and Statutory
Dimensions, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 823 (1985). The Court has also applied a
national security exception in two other instances. In Snepp v. United States, the Court
held that a former Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") employee's employment contract
requiring pre-publication review of any information relating to the agency to remove
classified information was a necessary prior restraint. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curium).
Later, the Court, in holding that the revocation of a passport of an individual that was
disclosing information about the CIA, stated that "no governmental interest is more
compelling than the security of the Nation." Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). In
a prior but similar case to Snepp, the Fourth Circuit also upheld a pre-employment
secrecy agreement. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 409
U.S. 1063 (1972).
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Equally important in the discussion of First Amendment
limitations to the ISA is the fact that the Supreme Court has never
addressed whether scientific information even constitutes speech for First
Amendment purposes. It has been argued that it should be clear that
scientific information should enjoy constitutional protection. 1l Others,
however, have looked to the effect of the information. Speech that
"contributes to human knowledge and sheds light on the consequences of
both alternative national policies and personal choices should be fully
protected." 211 It may be, though, that some other scientific speech is more
economically oriented, such as instructions on how to improve a product.
Thus it should not enjoy full protection as pure speech when it becomes
more like lesser-protected commercial speech. It could also be argued that
technical information may enjoy some protection under the obscenity
standard given in Miller v. California212 that "protects works which, taken
as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value."
21 3
The implication of this standard is that speech of scientific value is more
important, and more likely to be protected, than unprotected obscene
speech. Still others argue that there are a good number of occasions when
the need for secrecy outweighs any First Amendment concerns.214
Whatever the result may be, it is currently unclear exactly how much
protection scientific information enjoys under the First Amendment.
There is also an issue of whether a secrecy order should even be
considered a speech issue. An inventor, of course, does not have to file
for a patent. If the inventor never files an application, then the
government is not given an opportunity to issue a secrecy order. Naturally
the inventor then will not be able to have a limited monopoly over the
210 See HAROLD C. RELYEA, SILENCING SCIENCE: NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS AND
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION 11 (1994).
211 Funk, supra note 77, at 436-37. See Harold P. Green, Constitutional Implications of
Federal Restrictions on Scientific Research and Communication, 60 UMKC L. REV. 619,
643 (1992) (arguing that the degree of protection scientific information should receive
under the First Amendment "depends on a case by case balancing of the respective
interests"). See also Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 241 (arguing that restraints
on copyright speech are unconstitutional).
212 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
213 Id. at 34. See also Steven Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of American Science,
1979 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 13 (arguing that scientific information should enjoy protection under
the obscenity standard because of the inclusion of "scientific value" in the Miller test).
214 See John B. Attanasio, Review Essay, The Genetic Revolution: What Lawyers Don 't
Know, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 662, 697 (1988); Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The Occasions of
Secrecy, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 579, 674 (1986).
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invention. But if the inventor's primary concern is that the secrecy order
abridges his right to free speech, then he can simply disclose the invention
to the public and make his speech. However, if the inventor wants to be
able to exploit his invention under the protection of a patent, then he needs
to bargain with the Patent Office and he or she runs the risk that his
invention may be kept secret.
B. Other Concerns Involved With Using Secrecy Orders to Restrict
the Disclosure of Invention
The threat of a secrecy order being levied upon an invention may
also be a disincentive for inventors. Without the ability to see any rewards
or profits for their work, experimentation may become cost ineffective.215
In the alternative, the threat of a secrecy order may encourage an inventor,
where possible, to exploit his invention as a trade secret as opposed to file
for a patent and disclose the invention to the public. Trade secrets do have
certain distinctive advantages when compared to patents:
First, it is more expensive to acquire and defend a patent
than to keep a new technological development protected by
trade secret arrangements. Second, in addition to cost
considerations, the law of trade secrets is thought to be
more successful in safeguarding proprietary information.
Third, because approved patent applications are available
for public examination, there is a preference for the security
that is afforded by trade secrecy. Finally, there are
innovations that are simply not patentable. 21 6
This problem of course runs contrary to the basic mission of the
patent system, which encourages innovation and public disclosure by
granting limited in time monopolies on inventions. Without new
inventions reaching the public, the ISA would be in effect stifling the
215 See Amy E. Carroll, Not Always the Best Medicine: Biotechnology and the Global
Impact of U.S. Patent Law, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 2433, 2476-77 (1995).
[T]here are huge costs to consider in biotech research. Specifically in
the area of biotechnology-based pharmaceuticals, it takes about a
quarter of a billion dollars and four to seven years to bring a product to
market. Because of these enormous costs, the U.S. biotech industry
views the extra insurance of patents as crucial to protect their
investments, both domestically and abroad.
Id.
216 RELYEA, supra note 210, at 21-22.
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advancement of technology. The Supreme Court in Chakrabarty already
addressed this when it was hearing arguments as to whether biotechnology
was even patentable subject matter. The Court stated that:
The grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms is not
likely to put an end to genetic research or to its attendant
risks. The large amount of research that has already
occurred when no researcher had sure knowledge that
patent protection would be available suggests that
legislative or judicial fiat as to patentability will not deter
the scientific mind from probing into the unknown any
more than Canute could command the tides.
217
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Patent Examining System provides a mechanism
to take a proactive stance towards the problems of the proliferation of
technological information that could become a threat to the national
security of the United States. Biotechnology is a relatively novel and
rapidly expanding field of technology that has only recently gained
acceptance as patentable subject matter. As a recent development,
biotechnology is a not a national security priority at least within the
context of issuing patents. Yet biotechnology presents several threats that
should not be ignored. Scientists are unsure of what the release of
genetically modified organisms would do to the environment, so more
study is justified. The application of biotechnology to agriculture could be
as baneful as it is beneficial, as modified plants could dominate their
ecosystems or become ecological pests themselves.218 In addition, the
ever-present threat of biological warfare is only enhanced as scientists are
given the means to create more durable and lethal microbes.
The current statutory and regulatory regime is not equipped to fully
deal with the problems that biotechnology presents. Current statutes that
control the dissemination of scientific information were written in a time
before biotechnology had developed as a science. Most of these statutes
cannot even contemplate the domestic concerns of biotechnology.
Likewise, domestic regulation is divided among a variety of agencies with
differing agendas. In addition, most of this regulation does not address the
dissemination of the information generated in scientific research. Thus the
217 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316, 317 (1980).
218 See LEMBKE, supra note 37.
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current regulatory scheme cannot prevent the information on how to make
and use dangerous biotechnology from falling into the wrong hands.
The ISA provides a reasonable- solution to the threats of
biotechnology that will still allow the science to develop. The statute
allows the Patent Office to restrict patents from issue for a limited duration
while their threat to national security is evaluated. While there are some
constitutional concerns as to the implication of the secrecy order, this
process would allow the technology to be evaluated from the start before it
has a chance to become a problem. The information would also be
evaluated by the agency that would have appropriate resources to fully
analyze the problem. In effect, this would give the United States the first
chance to develop counter technologies to these threats, such as vaccines,
as may be necessary. At the same time, however, biotechnology patents
for non-threatening technologies would continue to issue so that the
science could continue to evolve.
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